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Abstract
Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning
procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume
that agents do not know their own payoff function, and have no information on the other player.
Furthermore, we assume that they have restrictions on their own action set such that, at each
stage, their choice is limited to a subset of their action set. We prove that the empirical dis-
tributions of play converge to the set of Nash equilibria for zero-sum and potential games, and
games where one player has two actions.
1 Introduction
First introduced by Brown [11] to compute the value of zero-sum games, fictitious play is one of
the most intensely studied and debated procedures in game theory. Consider an N -player normal
form game which is repeated in discrete time. At each time, players compute a best response to the
opponent’s empirical average play.
A major issue in fictitious play is identifying classes of games where the empirical frequencies of play
converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying game. A large body of literature has been
devoted to this question. Convergence for 2-player zero-sum games was obtained by Robinson [33]
and for general (non-degenerate) 2× 2 games by Miyasawa [30]. Monderer and Shapley [31] proved
the same result for potential games, and Berger [9] for 2-player games where one of the players
has only two actions. Recently, a large proportion of these results have been re-explored using the
stochastic approximation theory (see for example, Bena¨ım [3], Benveniste et al. [8], Kushner and
Yin [27]), where the asymptotic behavior of the fictitious play procedure can be analyzed through
related dynamics. For instance, Hofbauer and Sorin [23] obtain more general convergence results
for zero-sum games, while Bena¨ım, Hofbauer and Sorin [6] extend Monderer and Shapley’s result to
a general class of potential games, with nonlinear payoff functions on compact convex action sets.
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Most of these convergence properties also hold for smooth fictitious play, introduced by Fudenberg
and Kreps [15], (see also [16]), where agents use a fictitious play strategy in a game where payoff
functions are perturbed by random variables, in the spirit of Harsanyi [19]. For this adaptive
procedure, convergence holds in 2 × 2 games (see [5]), zero-sum, potential games (see [22]), and
supermodular games (see [4]).
As defined above, in fictitious play or smooth fictitious play, players compute best responses to
their opponents’ empirical frequencies of play. Three main assumptions are made here: (i) each
player knows the structure of the game, i.e. she knows her own payoff function; (ii) each player is
informed of the action selected by her opponents at each stage; thus she can compute the empirical
frequencies; (iii) each player is allowed to choose any action at each time, so that she can actually
play a best response.
The next question is usually, what happens if assumptions (i) and (ii) are relaxed. One approach
is to assume that the agents observe only their realized payoff at each stage. This is the minimal
information framework of the so-called reinforcement learning procedures (see [10, 13] for pioneer
work on this topic). Most work in this direction proceeds as follows: a) construct a sequence
of mixed strategies which are updated taking into account the payoff they receive (which is the
only information agents have access to) and b) study the convergence (or non-convergence) of this
sequence. It is supposed that players are given a rule of behavior (a decision rule) which depends
on a state variable constructed by means of the aggregate information they gather and their own
history of play.
It is noteworthy that most of the decision rules considered in the literature are stationary in the
sense that they are defined through a time-independent function of the state variable. This kind of
rule has proved useful in the analysis of simple cases (e.g. 2 × 2 games [32]), 2-players games with
positive payoff [2, 10, 25, 26] or in establishing convergence to perturbed equilibria in 2-player games
[28] or multiplayer games [12]. An example of a non-homogeneous (time-dependent) decision rule is
proposed by Leslie and Collins [29] where, via stochastic approximation techniques, convergence of
mixed actions is shown for zero-sum games and multiplayer potential games. Another interesting
example that implements a non-homogeneous decision rule is proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell
[21]. Using techniques based on consistent procedures (see Hart and Mas-Colell [20]), the authors
show that, for any game, the joint empirical frequency of play converges to the set of correlated
equilibria. To our knowledge, this is the only reinforcement learning procedure that uses a decision
rule depending explicitly on the last action played (i.e. it is Markovian). However, in all the
examples described above, assumption (iii) holds; in other words, players can use any action at any
time.
A different idea, that of releasing assumption (iii), comes from Bena¨ım and Raimond [7], who
introduced the Markovian fictitious play (MFP) procedure, where players have restrictions on their
action set, due to limited computational capacity or even to physical restrictions. Players know the
structure of the game and, at each time, they are informed of opponents’ actions, as in the fictitious
play framework. Under the appropriate conditions regarding payers’ ability to explore their action
set, it is shown that this adaptive procedure converges to Nash equilibria for zero-sum and potential
games.
Here, we drop all three assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii). The main novelty of this work is that
we construct a sophisticated, non-stationary learning procedure in 2-player games with minimal
information and restrictions on players’ action sets. We assume that players do not anticipate
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opponents’ behavior and that they have no information on the structure of the game (in particular,
they do not know their own payoff function) nor on opponents’ actions at each stage. This means
that the only information allowing agents to react to the environment is their past realized payoffs;
the adaptive procedure presented in this work thus belongs to the class of reinforcement learning
algorithms. In addition (and in the spirit of the (MFP) procedure), we suppose that at each stage
the agents are restricted to a subset of their action set, which depends on the action they chose at
the previous stage. The decision rule we implement is fully explicit, and it is easy for each agent to
compute the mixed strategy which dictates her next action. She actually chooses an action through
a non-homogeneous Markovian rule which depends on a meaningful state variable.
One of the main differences between this procedure and standard reinforcement learning is that
the sequence of mixed strategies is no longer a natural choice of state variable. Indeed, the set of
mixed strategies available to a given agent at time n + 1 depends on the action he chose at time
n. As a consequence, it is unrealistic to expect good asymptotic behavior from the sequence of
mixed strategies, and we turn our attention to the sequence of empirical moves. Our main finding is
that the empirical frequencies of play converge to Nash equilibria in zero-sum and potential games,
including convergence of the average scored payoffs. We also show convergence in the case where
at least one player has only two actions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the setting and present our model,
along with our main result. Section 3 introduces the general framework in which we analyze our
procedure. The related Markovian fictitious play procedure is also presented, to help the reader
better grasp our adaptive procedure. Section 4 gives the proof of our main result, presented as an
extended sketch, while the remaining results and technical comments are left to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Setting
Let G = (N, (Si)i∈N , (G
i)i∈N ) be a given finite normal form game and S =
∏
i S
i be the set of
action profiles. We call ∆(Si) the mixed action set, i.e
∆(Si) =

σi ∈ R|Si| :
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) = 1, σi(si) ≥ 0, ∀si ∈ Si

 ,
and ∆ =
∏
i∆(S
i). More generally, given a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of probability
distributions over S.
In the whole paper, for any agent i, we denote δsi the pure strategy i seen as an element of ∆(S
i).
As usual, we use the notation −i to exclude player i, namely S−i denotes the set
∏
j 6=i S
j and ∆−i
the set
∏
j 6=i∆(S
i).
Definition 2.1. The Best-Response correspondence for player i ∈ N , BRi : ∆−i ⇒ ∆(Si), is
defined as
BRi(σ−i) = argmax
σi∈∆(Si)
Gi(σi, σ−i).
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for any σ−i ∈ ∆−i. The Best-Response correspondence BR : ∆⇒ ∆ is given by
BR(σ) =
∏
i∈N
BRi(σ−i),
for all σ ∈ ∆.
Recall that a Nash equilibrium of the game G is a fixed point of the set-valued map BR, namely a
mixed action profile σ∗ ∈ ∆ such that σ∗ ∈ BR(σ∗).
2.2 Payoff-based Markovian procedure
We consider a situation where the game G described above is repeated in discrete time. Let sin ∈ S
i
be the action played by player i at time n. We assume that players do not know the game that
they are playing, i.e. they know neither their own payoff functions nor opponents’. Also we assume
that the information that a player can gather at any stage of the game is given by her payoff, i.e.
at each time n each player i ∈ N is informed of
gin = G
i(s1n, s
2
n, ..., s
N
n ).
Players are not able to observe opponents’ actions.
In this framework, a reinforcement learning procedure can be defined in the following manner. Let
us assume that, at the end of stage n ∈ N, player i has constructed a state variable Xin. Then
(a) at stage n + 1, player i selects a mixed strategy σin according to a decision rule, which can
depend on state variable Xin the time n.
(b) Player i’s action sin+1 is randomly drawn according to σ
i
n.
(c) She only observes gin+1, as a consequence of the realized action profile (s
1
n+1, . . . , s
N
n+1).
(d) Finally, this observation allows her to update her state variable to Xin+1 through an updating
rule, which can depend on observation gin+1, state variable X
i
n, and time n.
In this work we assume that, in addition, players have restrictions on their action set. This idea
was introduced by Bena¨ım and Raimond [7] through the definition of the (MFP) procedure (see
Section 3.2 for details). Suppose that, when an agent i plays a pure strategy s ∈ Si at stage n ∈ N,
her available actions at stage n + 1 are reduced to a subset of Si. This can be due to physical
restrictions, computational limitations or a large number of available actions. The subset of actions
available to player i depends on her last action and is defined through a stochastic exploration
matrix M i0 ∈ R
|Si|. In other words, if at stage n player i plays s ∈ Si, she can switch to action r 6= s
at stage n+ 1 if and only if M i0(s, r) > 0.
The matrix M i0 is assumed to be irreducible and reversible with respect to its unique invariant
measure pii0, i.e.
pii0(s)M
i
0(s, r) = pi
i
0(r)M
i
0(r, s),
for every s, r ∈ Si. This assumption guarantees that agents have access to any of their actions.
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Remark 2.2. Recall that a stochastic matrix M over a finite set S is said to be irreducible if it
has a unique recurrent class which is given by S.
For β > 0 and a vector R ∈ R|S
i|, we define the stochastic matrix M i[β,R] as
M i[β,R](s, r) =


M i0(s, r) exp(−β|R(s)−R(r)|+) s 6= r
1−
∑
s′ 6=s
M i[β,R](s, s′) s = r, (2.1)
where, for a number a ∈ R, |a|+ = max{a, 0}.
From the irreducibility of the exploration matrix M i0, we have that M
i[β,R] is also irreducible and
its unique invariant measure is given by
pii[β,R](s) =
pii0(s) exp(βR(s))∑
r∈Si
pii0(r) exp(βR(r))
, (2.2)
for any β > 0, R ∈ R|S
i|, and s ∈ Si.
Let (βin)n be a deterministic sequence and let Fn be the sigma algebra generated by the history of
play up to time n. We suppose that, at the end of stage n, player i has a state variable Rin ∈ R
|Si|.
Let M in = M
i[βin, R
i
n] and pi
i
n = pi
i
n[β
i
n, R
i
n]. Player i selects her action at time n + 1 through the
following choice rule:
σin(s) = P(s
i
n+1 = s | Fn) =M
i
n(s
i
n, s),
=


M i0(s
i
n, s) exp(−β
i
n|R
i
n(s
i
n)−R
i
n(s)|+) s 6= s
i
n
1−
∑
s′ 6=s
M in(s
i
n, s
′) s = sin.
(CR)
for every s ∈ Si. As we will see, variable Rin will be defined so as to be an estimator of the
time-average payoff vector.
At time n + 1, player i observes her realized payoff gin+1. The updating rule chosen by player i is
defined as follows. Agent i updates the vector Rin ∈ R
|Si|, only on the component associated to the
action selected at stage n. For every action s ∈ Si,
Rin+1(s) = R
i
n(s) + γ
i
n+1(s)
(
gin+1 −R
i
n(s)
)
1{s1
n+1
=s}, (UR)
where,
γin+1(s) = min
{
1 ,
1
(n+ 1)piin(s)
}
,
and 1E is the indicator of the event E.
Remark 2.3. Strictly speaking, the state variable is of the form Xin = (R
i
n, s
i
n), since the choice
rule (CR) is Markovian. We use this interpretation for the sake of simplicity.
Note that the step size γin+1(s) depends only on pi
i
0, β
i
n and R
i
n. Also, as we will see later on,γ
i
n(s) =
1/(npiin−1(s)) for sufficiently large n (c.f. Section A.2).
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While choosing this step size might appear surprising, we believe that it is actually very natural,
as it takes advantage of the fact that the invariant distribution piin is known by player i. To put
it another way: a natural candidate for step size γin(s) in (UR) is γ
i
n(s) = 1/θ
i
n(s), where θ
i
n(s) is
equal to the number of times agent i actually played action s during the n first steps. If the Markov
process was homogeneous and ergodic, with invariant measure pii, then the expected value of θin
would be exactly npii(s).
Consequently, our stochastic approximation scheme (UR) can be interpreted as follows. Assume
that, at time n + 1, action s is played by agent i. Then Rn+1(s) is updated by taking a convex
combination of Rn(s) and of the realized payoff playing s at time n + 1; additionally the weight
that is put on the realized payoff is inversely proportional to the number of times this action should
have been played (and not the number of times it has actually been played).
Let us denote by (vin)n the sequence of empirical distribution of moves of agent i, i.e.
vin =
1
n
n∑
m=1
δsim ,
and vn = (v
i
n)i∈N ∈ ∆.
Note that, given the physical restrictions on the action set, one cannot expect convergence results
on the mixed actions of players σin. Therefore, the empirical frequencies of play become the natural
focus of our analysis.
Definition 2.4. We call Payoff-based Markovian procedure the adaptive process where, for any
i ∈ N , agent i plays according to the choice rule (CR), and updates Rin through the updating rule
(UR).
2.3 Main result
In the case of a 2-player game, we introduce our major assumption on the positive sequence (βin)n.
Let us assume that, for i ∈ {1, 2},
(i) βin −→ +∞,
(ii) βin ≤ A
i
n ln(n), where A
i
n −→ 0.
(H)
Let us denote by gin the average payoff obtained by player i, i.e.
gin =
1
n
n∑
m=1
Gi(s1m, s
2
m), (2.3)
and gn = (g
1
n, g
2
n).
For a sequence (zn)n, we call L((zn)n) its limit set , i.e.
L((zn)n) =
{
z : there exists a subsequence (znk)k such that limk→+∞ znk = z
}
.
We say that the sequence (zn)n converges to a set A if L((zn)n) ⊆ A.
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Recall that G is a potential game with potential Φ if, for all i = 1, 2, and s−i ∈ S−i, we have
Gi(si, s−i)−Gi(ti, s−i) = Φ(si, s−i)− Φ(ti, s−i), for all si, ti ∈ Si.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2.5. Under assumption (H), the Payoff-based Markovian procedure enjoys the following
properties:
(a) In a zero-sum game, (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to the set of Nash equilibria and the
average payoff (g1n)n converges almost surely to the value of the game.
(b) In a potential game with potential Φ, (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to a connected subset
of the set of Nash equilibria on which Φ is constant, and 1n
∑n
m=1 Φ(s
1
m, s
2
m) converges to this
constant.
In the particular case G1 = G2, then (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to a connected subset
of the set of Nash equilibria on which G1 is constant; moreover (g1n)n converges almost surely
to this constant.
(c) If either |S1| = 2 or |S2| = 2, then (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to the set of Nash
equilibria.
In fact, we prove a more general result. We establish a relationship between the limit set of the
sequence (v1n, v
2
n)n and the attractors of the well-known Best-Response dynamics [17]
v˙ ∈ −v +BR(v). (BRD)
See Section 4 (Theorem 4.1) for details.
Comments on the result For potential games, in the general case, the payoff of a given player
is not necessarily constant on the limit set of (vn)n. However, the potential almost surely is.
Consider the game G, with payoff function G and potential Φ:
G =
a b c
A 1,1 9,0 1,0
B 0,9 6,6 0,8
C 0,1 9,0 2,2
and Φ =
a b c
A 4 3 3
B 3 0 2
C 3 2 4
(G)
There is a mixed Nash equilibrium, and two strict Nash equilibria (A, a) and (C, c), with same
potential value (equal to 4). However, P [L((vn)n) = {(A, a), (C, c)}] = 0, because this set is not
connected.
Now consider the following modified version G′:
7
G′ =
a b c
A 1,1 9,0 1,0
B 0,9 6,6 0,8
C 1,2 8,0 2,2
and Φ′ =
a b c
A 4 3 3
B 3 0 2
C 4 2 4
(G′)
Here we see that the set of Nash equilibria is connected and equal to
NE = {((x, 0, 1 − x), a), x ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {(C, (y, 0, 1 − y)), y ∈ [0, 1]} . (2.4)
Consequently, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that the limit set of (vn)n is equal to the
whole set of Nash equilibria. Therefore the payoff is not necessarily constant on L((vn)n).
Comments on the assumptions. Condition (H) assumes that the sequence βin increases to
infinity as o(ln(n)). This assumption is necessary due to the informational constraints on players.
For instance, it is not possible to know a priori how far the variables Ri0 are from the set of feasible
payoffs.
As we will see later on, in the Markovian fictitious play procedure, sequence βin is supposed to grow
more slowly than Ai ln(n), where Ai is smaller than a quantity which is related to the energy barrier
of the payoff matrix Gi (see [7] for details). This quantity is in turn related to the freezing schedule
of the simulated annealing algorithm (see for example [18, 24] and references therein).
We believe it is worth reformulating our result in this spirit. However, this requires players to have
more information about the game. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, suppose that the initial state variable Ri0
belongs to the set of feasible payoffs. Also, let us define the quantity
ωi = max
s∈Si
max
s−i,r−i∈S−i
|Gi(s, s−i)−Gi(s, r−i)|,
and let us assume that player i can choose a positive constant Ai such that
(i)βin −→ +∞,
(ii)βin ≤ A
i ln(n), where 2Aiωi < 1.
(H ′)
Then, we have the following version of our main result.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumption (H ′), conclusions of Theorem 2.5 hold.
The proof of this result runs along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2.5, and is therefore
omitted.
2.4 Examples
The following simple examples show the scope of our main result. In every case presented in this
section, we performed a maximum of 5× 105 iterations.
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Blind-restricted RSP. Consider the Rock-Scissor-Paper game defined by the payoff matrix G1:
R S P
R 0 1 -1
S -1 0 1
P 1 -1 0
(RSP )
Then the optimal strategies are given by ((1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)) ∈ ∆ and the value of the
game is 0. Assume that players’ exploration matrices and their invariant measures are given by
M10 =M
2
0 =

1/2 1/2 01/3 1/3 1/3
0 1/2 1/2

 and pi10 = pi20 =

2/73/7
2/7

 . (2.5)
Figure 1 means that if a player’s action is Rock at some time, she cannot select Paper immediately
R S P
Figure 1: Graph representing players’ restrictions for the (RSP ) game.
afterwards, and inversely. In Figure 2, we present a realization of (vn)n, as well as (g
1
n)n.
R
P
S R
P
S
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
time
Figure 2: At the top, a realization of vn (v1n on the left, v
2
n
on the right). At the bottom, g1
n
.
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3× 3 Potential game. Consider the potential game with payoff matrix G′ and potential Φ′ (see
(G′)). We assume that players’ exploration matrices are also given by (2.5). Therefore the graph
representing the restriction of players is given by Figure 1, if R,S and P are replaced by A,B and
C, respectively.
Figure 3 shows a realization of our procedure for the game (G′). On the left, we plot the evolution of
v1n. On the right, we present the corresponding trajectory of Φ
′
n =
1
n
∑n
m=1 Φ
′(s1m, s
2
m), the average
value of the potential Φ′ along the realization of (s1n, s
2
n)n. Note that our results do not stipulate
that (vn)n converges, and that our simulation tend towards non-convergence of v
1
n. We choose not
to display v2n here (which seems to converge to the action a).
A
C
B
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4
time
Φ
′
n
Figure 3: Simulation results for the potential game (G′).
5× 5 Identical interests game. Consider the game with identical interests where both players
have 5 actions and the common payoff matrix is given by
A B C D E
A 2 0 0 0 0
B 0 1 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 1 0
E 0 0 0 0 2
(C)
Assume that players’ exploration matrices are
M10 =M
2
0 =


1/2 0 1/2 0 0
0 1/2 1/2 0 0
1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
0 0 1/2 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2

 with pi10 = pi20 =


2/13
2/13
5/13
2/13
2/13


Note that, even if the center action C is bad for both players, the restrictions force them to play C
every time they switch to another action.
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CA B
D E
Figure 4: Graph representing players’ restrictions for the game (C).
In Figure 5, on the left, we present a realization where (v1n, v
2
n) converges to the NE (B,B). On
the right, a trajectory where (v1n, v
2
n) converges to the NE (E,E) is displayed. Note that, in both
cases, the average realized payoff gn converges to the payoff of the corresponding equilibrium. For
simplicity, we only plot the component that converges to one for the first player. This is consistent
with the recent finding that the four strict Nash equilibria have a positive probability of being the
limit of the random process (vn)n (see [14] for details).
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time
v1
n
(B)
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time
v1
n
(E)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
time
g1
n
(a) On top, v1n(B) → 1. On the bottom, g
1
n
→
1.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
time
g1n
(b) On top, v1n(B) → 1. On the bottom, g
1
n
→
2.
Figure 5: Two realizations of the procedure for the game (C).
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3 Preliminaries to the proof, related work
The aim of this section is twofold: we introduce the general framework in which we analyze our pro-
cedure, and we present the relatedMarkovian fictitious play procedure, where the idea of restrictions
on the action set was first introduced.
3.1 A general framework
Let S be a finite set and let M(S) be the set of Markov matrices over S. We consider a discrete
time stochastic process (sn,Mn)n defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) and taking values in
S ×M(S). The space (Ω,F ,P) is equipped with a non-decreasing sequence of σ-algebras (Fn)n.
Let us assume that the process (sn,Mn)n satisfies the following assumptions.
(i) The sequence (sn,Mn)n is Fn-measurable for all n ∈ N.
(ii) For all s ∈ S, P(sn+1 = s | Fn) =Mn(sn, s).
(iii) For all n ∈ N, the matrix Mn is irreducible with invariant measure pin ∈ ∆(S).
(H0)
Let Σ be a compact convex subset of an euclidean space and, for all n ∈ N, let Vn = H(sn) ∈ Σ.
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the random sequence zn =
1
n
∑n
m=1 Vm. Let us call
µn =
∑
s∈S
pin(s)H(s) ∈ Σ. (3.1)
Remark 3.1. This setting is a simplification of that considered by Bena¨ım and Raimond [7],
where a of more general observation term Vn is treated. For instance Vn may depend on other
non-observable variables or explicitly on time.
In order to maintain the terminology employed in [7], we introduce the following definition, which
is stated in a slightly different form (see [7, Definition 2.4]).
Definition 3.2. A set-valued map with nonempty convex values C : Σ ⇒ Σ is adapted to the
random sequence (zn, µn)n if
i) its graph
Gr(C) = {(z, µ) : z ∈ Σ, µ ∈ C(z)}
is closed in Σ× Σ.
ii) Almost surely, for any limit point (z, µ) of (zn, µn)n, we have (z, µ) ∈ Gr(C).
Given a set-valued map C : Σ ⇒ Σ adapted to a random sequence (zn, µn)n, we consider the
differential inclusion
z˙ ∈ −z + C(z). (DI)
Under the assumptions above, it is well known (see, e.g. Aubin and Cellina [1]) that (DI) admits at
least one solution (i.e. an absolutely continuous mapping z : R→ Rd such that z˙(t) ∈ −z(t)+C(z(t))
for almost every t) through any initial point.
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Definition 3.3. A nonempty compact set A ⊆ Σ is called an attractor for (DI), provided
(i) it is invariant, i.e. for all v ∈ A, there exists a solution z to (DI) with z(0) = v and such that
z(R) ⊆ A,
(ii) there exists an open neighborhood U of A such that, for every  > 0, there exists t > 0 such
that
z(t) ⊆ N (A)
for any solution z starting in U and all t > t, where N
ε(A) is the ε-neighborhood of A. An
open set U with this property is called a fundamental neighborhood of A.
A compact set D ⊆ Σ is internally chain transitive (ICT) if it is invariant, connected and has no
proper attractors. See Bena¨ım, Hofbauer and Sorin [6] for a full discussion.
Let m(t) = sup{m ≥ 0 : t ≥ τm}, where τm =
∑m
j=1
1
j . For a sequence (un)n and a number T > 0,
we define (un, T ) by
(un, T ) = sup


∥∥∥∥∥∥
l−1∑
j=n
uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ; l ∈ {n+ 1, . . . ,m(τn + T )}

 .
Let us denote by (Wn)n the random sequence defined by Wn+1 = H(sn+1)− µn. The evolution of
zn can be recast as
zn+1 − zn =
1
n+ 1
(µn − zn +Wn+1). (3.2)
A consequence of [7, Theorem 2.6] in this particular framework is the following result.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that the set-valued map C is adapted to (zn, µn)n and that for all T > 0
lim
n→+∞

(
1
n+ 1
Wn+1, T
)
= 0, (3.3)
almost surely. Then the limit set of (zn)n is, almost surely, an ICT set of the differential inclusion
(DI). In particular, if A is a global attractor for (DI) then the limit set of (zn)n is almost surely
contained in A.
Remark 3.5. Roughly speaking, the fact that the set-valued map C is adapted to (zn, µn) means
that (3.2) can be recast as
zn+1 − zn ∈
1
n+ 1
(−zn + C(zn) +Wn+1).
In turn, this recursive form can be seen as a Cauchy-Euler Scheme to approximate the solutions
of the differential inclusion (DI) with decreasing step sizes and added noise term (Wn)n. Assump-
tion (3.3) guarantees that, on any given time horizon, the noise term asymptotically vanishes. As
a consequence, the limit set of (zn)n can be described through the deterministic dynamics (DI), in
the sense that it needs to be internally chain transitive. If the differential inclusion admits a global
attractor, then any ICT set is contained in it. This implies the second point of the theorem (again,
see [6] for more details about stochastic approximations for differential inclusions) .
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3.2 Markovian fictitious play
Bena¨ım and Raimond [7] introduce an adaptive process they call Markovian fictitious play (MFP).
As in Section 2, we consider that players have constraints on their action set, i.e. each player has an
exploration matrix M i0 which is supposed to be irreducible and reversible with respect to its unique
invariant measure pii0.
The crucial difference between (MFP) and the procedure introduced in Section 2.2 is that players
know their own payoff function. Also, at the end of each stage, each player is informed of the
opponent’s action. The (MFP) procedure is defined as follows. A player’s i action at time n+ 1 is
chosen accordingly to the non-homogeneous Markov matrix
P(sin+1 = s | Fn) =M
i[βin, U
i
n](s
i
n, s),
=


M i0(s
1
n, s) exp(−β
i
n|U
i
n(s
i
n)− U
i
n(s)|+) s 6= s
1
n,
1−
∑
s′ 6=s
M i[βin, U
i
n](s
i
n, s
′) s = s1n,
(MFP)
where U in is taken as the vector payoffs of player i, against the average moves of the opponent
U in = G
i(·, v−in ) =
1
n
n∑
m=1
Gi(·, s−im ), (3.4)
for all s ∈ Si, and the function M i[·, ·] is defined by (2.1). Let M˜ in = M
i[βin, U
i
n]. Observe that
again, from the irreducibility of M i0, the matrix M˜
i
n is also irreducible. Also, p˜i
i
n = pi
i[βin, G
i(·, v−in )]
(where pii[·, ·] is defined in (2.2)) is the unique invariant measure of M˜ in, i.e.
p˜in(s) =
pii0(s) exp(β
i
nU
i
n(s))∑
s′∈Si
pii0(s
′) exp(βinU
i
n(s
′))
, (3.5)
for every s ∈ Si.
Bena¨ım and Raimond [7] obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.6. If both players follow the (MFP) procedure, then the limit set of the sequence vn =
(v1n, v
2
n) is an ICT set of the Best-Response dynamics (BRD), provided for i ∈ {1, 2} the positive
sequence (βin)n satisfies
(i) βin → +∞ as n→ +∞.
(ii) βin ≤ A
i log(n), for a sufficiently small positive constant Ai.
As a consequence, we have the following.
(a) In a zero-sum game, (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to the set of Nash equilibria.
(b) If G1 = G2, then (v1n, v
2
n)n converges almost surely to a connected subset of the set of Nash
equilibria on which G1 is constant.
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Some insights on the proof of Theorem 3.6
We believe it is interesting to sketch the proof of Theorem 3.6. For that purpose, we need to
introduce some notions that will be useful later on.
Let S be a finite set and M an irreducible stochastic matrix over S with invariant measure pi. For
a function f : S → R, the variance and the energy of f are defined, respectively, as
var(f) =
∑
s∈S
pi(s)f2(s)−
(∑
s∈S
pi(s)f(s)
)2
,
E(f, f) =
1
2
∑
s,r∈S
(f(s)− f(r))2M(s, r)pi(s).
Definition 3.7. Let M be a stochastic irreducible matrix over the finite set S and pi be its unique
invariant measure.
(i) The spectral gap of M is defined by
χ(M) = min
{
E(f, f)
var(f)
: var(f) 6= 0
}
. (3.6)
(ii) The pseudo-inverse of M is the unique matrix Q ∈ R|S|×|S| such that
∑
rQ(s, r) = 0, for
every s ∈ S, which satisfies the Poisson’s equation
Q(I −M) = (I −M)Q = I −Π, (3.7)
where Π is the matrix defined as Π(s, r) = pi(r) for every s, r ∈ S and I denotes the identity
matrix.
For a matrix Q ∈ R|S|×|S| and a vector U ∈ R|S|, set |Q| = maxs,r |Q(s, r)| and |U | = maxs |U(s)|.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 3.6 We apply Theorem 3.4 with H(s) = (δs1 , δs2). Recall
that vin is the empirical frequency of play of player i. Thus, the random variable zn = vn is given
by
vn =
1
n
n∑
m=1
(
δs1n , δs2n
)
=
(
v1n, v
2
n
)
.
Therefore, the evolution of vn is described by
vn+1 − vn =
1
n+ 1
(µn − vn +Wn+1), (3.8)
where µn =
∑
s∈S p˜in(s)H(s) =
(
p˜i1n, p˜i
2
n
)
and W˜n+1 = (δs1n , δs2n)− µn =
(
δs1n − p˜i
1
n, δs2n − p˜i
2
n
)
.
We first provide a sketch of the proof that (3.3) holds for the sequence (W˜n)n. Afterwards, we will
verify that the set-valued map BR is adapted to (vn, µn)n and conclude by applying Theorem 3.4.
Consequences (a) and (b) for games follow from the fact that the set of Nash equilibria is an attractor
for the Best-Response dynamics in the relevant classes of games. We will omit this part of the proof,
since the same argument will be used in Section 4.2.
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Let Q˜in be the pseudo-inverse of M˜
i
n. Bena¨ım and Raimond prove that if , for i ∈ {1, 2},
lim
n→+∞
|Q˜in|
2 ln(n)
n
= 0,
lim
n→+∞
|Q˜in+1 − Q˜
i
n| = 0,
lim
n→+∞
|p˜iin+1 − p˜i
i
n| = 0,
(3.9)
almost surely, then (3.3) holds for (W˜n)n.
Proposition 3.4 in [7] shows that the norm of Q˜in can be controlled as a function of the spectral gap
χ(M˜ in). If in addition the constants A
i are sufficiently small, then (3.9) holds.
Finally, since βin → +∞, we have that if (v
1
n, v
2
n)→ (v
1, v2), then p˜iin → pi
i[v−i], where, for all s ∈ Si
pii[v−i](s) =
pii0(s)1{s∈argmaxr Gi(r,v−i)}∑
s′∈Si
pii0(s
′)1{s′∈argmaxr Gi(r,v−i)}
∈ BRi(v−i).
This implies that map BR is adapted to (vn, µn)n and the proof is finished.
4 Proof of the main result
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we will prove a more general result. The following theorem implies
that the conclusions of Theorem 3.6 hold for our procedure.
Theorem 4.1. Under hypothesis (H), assume that players follow the Payoff-based adaptive Marko-
vian procedure. Then the limit set of the sequence (vn)n is an ICT set of the Best-Response dynamics
(BRD). In particular if (BRD) admits a global attractor A, then L((vn)n) ⊆ A.
There are two key aspects which highlight the difference between the proof of Theorem 4.1 and
the proof of Theorem 3.6. First, to show that the noise sequence (defined in (4.2) below) satisfies
condition (3.3), we cannot directly use condition (3.9). Second, the proof that BR is adapted to
(vn, µn)n is considerably more involved. In contrast to the approach for the (MFP) procedure, the
invariant measure piin of matrix M
i
n depends on state variable R
i
n which is updated, in turn, using
piin−1. To overcome these difficulties, we develop a more general approach, that is presented in the
Appendix.
In what follows, we present an extended sketch of the proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof of Theo-
rem 2.5 will follow as a corollary.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We aim to apply Theorem 3.4. Let Σ = ∆(S1) × ∆(S2). We take Vn = (δs1n , δs2n) and
µn = (pi
1
n, pi
2
n). As before, let vn = (v
1
n, v
2
n). Then we have
vn+1 − vn =
1
n+ 1
(
µn − vn +Wn+1
)
, (4.1)
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where
W n+1 =
(
W
1
n+1,W
2
n+1
)
= (δs1
n+1
− pi1n, δs2
n+1
− pi2n). (4.2)
We need to verify that two conditions hold. First we need to prove that 
(
1
n+1Wn+1, T
)
goes to
zero almost surely for all T > 0. Proposition A.6 (ii) provides proof of this.
Second, we need to verify that the Best-Response correspondence BR is adapted to (vn, µn)n. As
we will see, this problem basically amounts to showing that vector Rin becomes a good asymptotic
estimator of vector Gi(·, v−in ).
Fix i ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ Si. Lemma A.3 shows that for a sufficiently large n, (γin+1(s))
−1 = (n+1)piin(s)
for any s ∈ Si. Therefore, from the definition of Rin and without any loss of generality, we have
Rin+1(s)−R
i
n(s) =
1
(n + 1)piin(s)
[
1{si
n+1
=s}G
i(s, s−in+1)− 1{si
n+1
=s}R
i
n(s)
]
,
=
1
(n + 1)piin(s)
[
piin(s)
(
Gi(s, pi−in )−R
i
n(s)
)
+
+
(
1{si
n+1
=s}G
i(s, s−in+1)− pi
i
n(s)G
i(s, pi−in )
)
+Rin(s)
(
piin(s)− 1{si
n+1
=s}
)]
,
=
1
n+ 1
[
Gi(s, pi−in )−R
i
n(s) +W
i
n+1(s)
]
, (4.3)
where for convenience we set W in+1(s) =W
i,1
n+1(s) +W
i,2
n+1(s) with
W i,1n+1(s) =
Rin(s)
piin(s)
(
piin(s)− 1{si
n+1
=s}
)
, and (4.4)
W i,2n+1(s) =
1
piin(s)
(
1{si
n+1
=s}G
i(s1n+1, s
2
n+1)− pi
i
n(s)G
i(s, pi−in )
)
. (4.5)
Propositions A.6(i) and A.7 prove that, almost surely and for any T > 0, 
(
1
n+1W
i,1
n+1(s), T
)
→ 0
and 
(
1
n+1W
i,2
n+1(s), T
)
→ 0, respectively.
Recall that U in = G
i(·, v−in ). Naturally, the evolution of vector U
i
n can be written as
U in+1 − U
i
n =
1
n+ 1
(
Gi(·, pi−in )− U
i
n +W
i,3
n+1
)
, (4.6)
where
W i,3n+1 = G
i(·, s−in+1)−G
i(·, pi−in ).
Again, Proposition A.6 (iii) shows that for all T > 0, 
(
1
n+1W
i,3
n+1, T
)
→ 0 almost surely.
We define ζ in = R
i
n − G
i(·, v−in ) = R
i
n − U
i
n. Equations (4.3) and (4.6), show that the evolution of
the sequence (ζ in)n can be recast as
ζ in+1 − ζ
i
n =
1
n+ 1
[
− ζ in +W
i
n+1
]
, (4.7)
where
W in+1 =W
i,1
n+1 +W
i,2
n+1 −W
i,3
n+1,
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and each component of W i,1n+1 and W
i,2
n+1 defined by Equations (4.4) and (4.5), respectively.
Collecting all the analysis above, we conclude that 
(
1
n+1W
i
n+1, T
)
→ 0 almost surely for all T > 0.
Based on the fact that sequence (ζ in)n is bounded (see Lemma A.3) and on standard results from
stochastic approximation theory (see, e.g. Bena¨ım [3]), the limit set of the sequence (ζ in)n is almost
surely an ICT set of the ordinary differential equation ζ˙ = −ζ which admits the set {0} as a global
attractor.
Therefore, for i ∈ {1, 2}, Rin −G
i(·, v−in )→ 0 as n→ +∞, almost surely.
Now let us assume that
(v1nk , v
2
nk
)→ (v1, v2) ∈ Σ, and (pi1nk , pi
2
nk
)→ (pi1, pi2) ∈ Σ,
for a sub-sequence (nk)k.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let r /∈ argmaxs′ G
i(s′, v−i) and take sˆ ∈ Si such that
Gi(r, v−i) < Gi(sˆ, v−i).
Since Rin −G
i(·, v−in )→ 0, there exists ε > 0 and k0 ∈ N such that, for any k ≥ k0,
Rink(r) < R
i
nk
(sˆ)− ε.
So that, for k sufficiently large,
piink(r) ≤
piio(r)
piio(sˆ)
exp
[
βink(R
i
nk
(r)−Rink(sˆ))
]
≤
piio(r)
piio(sˆ)
exp(−βinkε).
Then pii(r) = 0 and we have proved that pii ∈ BRi(v−i) which implies that set-valued map BR is
adapted to
(
vn, µn
)
n
.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2.5
For all three points, the result follows from a direct application of Theorem 4.1.
Consider the variable zn = (v
1
n, v
2
n, g
1
n, g
2
n), where g
i
n =
1
n
∑n
m=1 g
i
m is the average realized payoff for
player i ∈ {1, 2}. Recall that the evolution of gin can be written as
gin+1 − g
i
n+1 =
1
n+ 1
(
gin+1 − g
i
n
)
=
1
n+ 1
(
Gi(piin, pi
−i
n )− g
i
n +W
i,4
n+1
)
,
where W i,4n+1 = G
i(sin+1, s
−i
n+1)−G
i(piin, pi
−i
n ).
Let G be the convex hull in R2 of the set {(G1(s, r), G2(s, r)) : s ∈ S1 , r ∈ S2} and let Σ =
∆(S1)×∆(S2)×G. We define the set-valued map C : Σ→ Σ as
C(z) =
{
(α1, α2, γ) ∈ Σ : α1 ∈ BR1(v2), α2 ∈ BR2(v1), γ = (G1(α1, α2), G2(α1, α2))
}
,
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for z = (v1, v2, g1, g2) ∈ Σ and we consider the differential inclusion
z˙ ∈ −z +C(z). (4.8)
From Theorem 4.1, the mapC is adapted to (zn, µn)C, where µn = (pi
1
n, pi
2
n, (G
1(pi1n, pi
2
n), G
2(pi1n, pi
2
n)).
Proposition A.7 (ii) shows that (W i,4n+1/(n + 1), T ) goes to zero almost surely for all fixed T > 0.
Therefore, by writing the evolution of zn in the same manner as for vn before, we can conclude that
the limit set of the sequence (zn)n is an ICT set of the differential inclusion (4.8).
Zero-sum games Hofbauer and Sorin [23] (by exhibiting an explicit Lyapunov function) show
that the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for BR. Hence, if we denote by g∗ the value of
the game, a direct consequence is that
{(v1, v2, g1, g2) : v1 ∈ BR1(v2) , v2 ∈ BR2(v1) , (G1(v1, v2), G2(v1, v2)) = (g∗,−g∗))}
is a global attractor for (4.8). Therefore (vn)n converges to the set of Nash equilibria and g
1
n
converges to the value of the game.
Potential games In the same spirit as above, Φ is a Lyapunov function for the differential
inclusion (4.8) (see Bena¨ım, Hofbauer and Sorin [6, Theorem 5.5]). Since, in our case, the payoff
functions are linear in all variables, Propositions 3.27 and 3.28 in [6] imply that (vn)n converges
almost surely to a connected component of Nash equilibria on which the potential Φ is constant. In
particular, if G1 = G2, let G∗ be the value of G on the limit set of (vn)n. Then limnG(v
1
n, v
2
n) = G
∗.
Therefore, by definition of C, we also have limn g
1
n = G
∗.
2 ×N games Our result follows from the fact that any trajectory of the Best-Response dynamics
converges to the set of Nash equilibria in this case (see Berger [9]).
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A Appendix
While Assumption (H) is used here, in fact, the proofs are written in such a way that they can be
easily extended to the case where the less stringent Assumption (H ′) is considered on the sequences
(βin)n.
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A.1 A general result
Returning to the framework of Section 3.1, we consider a discrete time stochastic process (sn,Mn)n,
defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P), taking values in S ×M(S) and satisfying (H0). The
space (Ω,F ,P) is equipped with a non-decreasing sequence of σ-algebras (Fn)n. Let Σ be a compact
convex nonempty set which is assumed, for simplicity, to be contained in R|S|. It will become clear
that the argument extends to the case of arbitrary euclidean spaces.
As before, let H : S → Σ, Vn = H(sn) and µn be defined by (3.1). The pseudo-inverse matrix of
Mn is denoted by Qn (see (3.7)). The following technical proposition will be key to our main result.
Proposition A.1. Let (εn)n be a real random process which is adapted to (Fn)n. Let us assume
that, almost surely,
(i) |εn||Qn| ≤ n
a for a < 1/2 and n large,
(ii) |Qn||εn − εn−1| → 0 ,
(iii) |εn| (|Qn+1 −Qn|+ |pin+1 − pin|)→ 0.
Let
Wn+1 = εn (Vn+1 − µn) .
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
Wn+1, T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
Proof. Let c be a positive constant that may change from line to line. In a similar manner as in the
proof of [7, Theorem 2.6], we can decompose the noise term as follows:
1
n+ 1
Wn+1 =
εn
n+ 1
(Vn+1 − µn),
=
εn
n+ 1
(H(sn+1)− µn),
=
εn
n+ 1
(H(sn+1)−
∑
s∈S
pin(s)H(s)).
For a matrix A ∈ R|S|×|S| and for any r ∈ S, let A[r] be the r-th line of A. Let us identify the
function H with the matrix H where, for each r ∈ S, H[r] = H(r). Notice that, by definition of
the matrix Πn, we have that ΠnH[r] = µn for every r ∈ S. Therefore we can write
1
n+ 1
Wn+1 =
εn
n+ 1
((I −Πn)H) [sn+1]
=
εn
n+ 1
((Qn −MnQn)H) [sn+1],
=
εn
n+ 1
((QnH)[sn+1]− (MnQnH)[sn+1]) ,
=
4∑
j=1
ujk,
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where the second identity follows from the definition of the pseudo-inverse matrix, and
u1n =
εn
n+ 1
((QnH)[sn+1]− (MnQnH)[sn]) ,
u2n =
εn
n+ 1
(MnQnH)[sn]−
εn−1
n
(MnQnH)[sn],
u3n =
εn−1
n
(MnQnH)[sn]−
εn
n+ 1
(Mn+1Qn+1H)[sn+1],
u4n =
εn
n+ 1
(Mn+1Qn+1H)[sn+1]−
εn
n+ 1
(MnQnH)[sn+1],
=
εn
n+ 1
(Mn+1Qn+1 −MnQn)H[sn+1].
Since E((QnH)[sn+1] | Fn) = (MnQnH)[sn], the random process u
1
n is a martingale difference and
∥∥u1n∥∥ ≤ c |εn||Qn|n+ 1 .
The exponential martingale inequality (see Equation (18) in [3]) gives that, for all K > 0
P((u1n, T ) ≥ K) ≤ c exp
(
−K2
c
∑m(τn+T )
j=n ε
2
j |Qj |
2/j2
)
.
By assumption we have that, almost surely and for j large enough, |εj ||Qj | ≤ j
a, for a < 1/2. So
that
c
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
ε2j |Qj|
2
j2
≤ c
1
n1−2a
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
1
j
≤ c
T + 1
n1−2a
,
by definition of m(t). Therefore
P((u1n, T ) ≥ K) ≤ c exp
(
−
K2
T + 1
n2a−1
)
.
Finally, from the fact that a < 1/2, we have
∑
n≥1 P((u
1
k, T ) ≥ K) < +∞ for all K > 0 and the
Borel–Cantelli lemma implies that (u1n, T )→ 0 almost surely.
For the second term,
(u2n, T ) ≤ c
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
|Qj |
∣∣∣∣εj−1j − εjj + 1
∣∣∣∣ ,
= c
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
|Qj |
∣∣∣∣ (j + 1)εj−1 − jεjj(j + 1)
∣∣∣∣ = c
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
|Qj |
∣∣∣∣εj−1 − εjj + εjj(j + 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ c
[
sup
j≥n
|Qj ||εj − εj−1|+ sup
j≥n
|Qj||εj |
j + 1
]m(τn+T )∑
j=n
1
j
,
≤ c
[
sup
j≥n
|Qj ||εj − εj−1|+ sup
j≥n
|Qj||εj |
j + 1
]
(T + 1),
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by definition of m(t). Hence, from assumptions (i) and (ii), we conclude that (u2n, T ) → 0 almost
surely.
Now for u3n, by cancellation of successive terms,
(u3n, T ) =
εn−1
n
(MnQnH)[sn]−
εm(τn+T )−1
m(τn + T )
(Mm(τn+T )Qm(τn+T )H)[sm(τn+T )],
≤ 2 sup
j≥n
|Qj||εj−1|
j
.
which implies, by (i), that (u3n, T )→ 0 almost surely.
For the fourth term, recall that MnQn = Qn − I +Πn for all n ∈ N. Therefore, we can write
u4n =
εn
n+ 1
(Qn+1 −Qn − (Πn+1 −Πn))H[sn+1].
Hence
(u4n, T ) ≤ c
m(τn+T )∑
j=n
1
j
[
sup
j≥n
|εj ||Qj+1 −Qj|+ |εj ||pij+1 − pij|
]
,
≤ c(T + 1)
[
sup
j≥n
|εj ||Qj+1 −Qj |+ |εj ||pij+1 − pij |
]
.
Assumption (iii) implies that (u4n, T )→ 0 almost surely, as n goes to infinity.
A.2 Stability
The following lemma is a trivial consequence of the recursive definition of the vector Rin and the
fact that γin(s) ∈]0, 1].
Lemma A.2. For any i ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ Si, n ∈ N, we have Rin(s) ∈ [−K
i,Ki], where
Ki = max{max
s,r∈Si
|Ri0(s)−R
i
0(r)|,max
s∈Si
max
s−i,r−i∈S−i
|Gi(s, s−i)−Gi(s, r−i)|}. (A.1)
The following result states that, without loss of generality, we can suppose that the step size γin(s)
is equal to 1/npiin−1(s) for all s ∈ S
i.
Lemma A.3. Let α ∈]0, 1[ There exists n0(α) ∈ N (which only depends on α, R
i
0, the payoff
functions Gi and the vanishing sequence (Ain)n) such that, for any n ≥ n0(α) and s ∈ S
i,
piin(s) ≥ n
−α.
In particular, there exists n0 ∈ N such that, for any n ≥ n0 and s ∈ S
i,
γin(s) =
1
npiin−1(s)
.
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Proof. Let α ∈]0, 1[ and α′ ∈]0, α[. Choose n0 ∈ N such that, for any n ≥ n0, 2K
iAin ≤ α
′, where
Ki is defined in (A.1), and take rn ∈ S
i such that Rin(rn) = maxr R
i
n(r). Then, for any s ∈ S
i,
piin(s) =
pii0(s) exp
(
Ain ln(n)(R
i
n(s)−R
i
n(rn))
)
pii0(rn) +
∑
r 6=rn
pii0(r) exp (A
i
n ln(n)(R
i
n(r)−R
i
n(rn))
≥ pii0(s) exp
(
−2Ain ln(n)K
i
)
≥ min
r
pii0(r) exp(−α
′ ln(n)) ≥ min
r
pii0(r)n
−α′ .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that n0 is large enough so that minr pi
i
0(r)n
−α′ ≥ n−α.
This concludes the proof of the first point. In particular, there exists n0 ∈ N such that, for any
n ≥ n0, (n+ 1)pi
i
n(s) > 1, which proves the second point.
A.3 Analysis of the noise sequences
Let us fix i ∈ {1, 2} and let χin be the spectral gap of the matrix M
i
n =M [β
i
n, R
i
n], i.e.
χin = min
{
E in(f, f)
varin(f)
: varin(f) 6= 0
}
,
where
varin(f) =
∑
s∈Si
piin(s)f
2(s)−

∑
s∈Si
piin(s)f(s)


2
,
E in(f, f) =
1
2
∑
s,r∈Si
(f(s)− f(r))2M in(s, r)pi
i
n(s).
The following result is a direct consequence of results of Holley and Strook [24].
Lemma A.4. There exists a positive constant c such that, for a sufficiently large n ∈ N
c exp(−2Kiβin) ≤ χ
i
n, (A.2)
where Ki is defined in Equation (A.1).
Proof. By Lemma 2.7 in [24], for sufficiently large n,
χin ≥ c exp(−β
i
nmn),
where
mn = max
s,r∈Si
{
min
γ∈Γ
max
s′∈γ
Rin(s
′)−Rin(s)−R
i
n(r) + min
s′∈Si
Rin(s
′)
}
,
and Γ is the set of every path from s to r on the graph that represents the action set of player i.
Now it is clear that mn ≤ 2K
i, by Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.5. Given s ∈ Si, under assumption (H) the following holds, almost surely, as n→ +∞.
(i)
|Qin|
napiin(s)
b
−→ 0, for any a > 0, b > 0,
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(ii)
|Qin+1 −Q
i
n|n
1−α
piin(s)
−→ 0 and
|piin+1 − pi
i
n|n
1−α
piin(s)
−→ 0 for any α > 0.
Proof. Let c be a general positive constant that may change from line to line.
(i) The first inequality in [7, Proposition 3.4] (based on estimations obtained by Saloff-Coste [34])
reads in this case, for n ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ Si,
|Qin(s, s
′)| ≤
1
χin
(
piin(s
′)
piin(s)
)1/2
≤
1
χin
(piin(s))
−1/2, (A.3)
Let a > 0 and b > 0. By Lemma A.4, (χin)
−1 ≤ c−1n2K
iAin . Pick ab+1/2 > α > 0. There exists
n0(α) such that, for any n ≥ n0, for any s ∈ S
i, piin(s) ≥ n
−α Therefore for sufficiently large
n,
|Qin|
napiin(s)
b
≤ c−1
n2K
iAin+α/2
nan−bα
= c−1n2K
iAin+α(1/2+b)−a.
Thus the conclusion follows from the fact that α(1/2 + b)− a < 0 and limnA
i
n = 0.
(ii) Let α > 0. Recall that M in =M
i[βin, R
i
n] and let us assume without loss of generality that the
sequence (Ain)n is non-increasing. Therefore
|M in+1 −M
i
n| ≤
∣∣M i[βin+1, Rin+1]−M i[βin, Rin+1]∣∣+ ∣∣M i[βin, Rin+1]−M i[βin, Rin]∣∣ .
A simple application of the mean value theorem on the functions β → M i[β,R] and R →
M i[β,R] yields, respectively,
∣∣M i[βin+1, Rin+1]−M i[βin, Rin+1]∣∣ ≤ Ainn ,
and ∣∣M i[βin, Rin+1]−M i[βin, Rin]∣∣ ≤ cβin|Rin+1 −Rin|,
By Lemma A.3, and since |Rin+1 −R
i
n| ≤ maxs∈Si cγ
i
n+1(s), we have that∣∣M in+1 −M in∣∣ ≤ 1n1−α/4
for sufficiently large n. Analogously, recalling that piin = pi
i[βin, R
i
n], we have
|piin+1 − pi
i
n| ≤
1
n1−α/4
. (A.4)
for sufficiently large n. Recall that, from part (i), |Qin| ≤ n
α/8 for sufficiently large n. Also,
piin(s) ≥ n
−α/4. Using the last inequality in the proof of [7, Proposition 3.3]:
|Qin+1 −Q
i
n| ≤ c
(
|Qin+1||Q
i
n||M
i
n+1 −M
i
n|+ |Q
i
n||pi
i
n+1 − pi
i
n|
)
,
we have that
|Qin+1 −Q
i
n|n
1−α
piin(s)
≤ cn1−αnα/4
(
|Qin+1||Q
i
n||M
i
n+1 −M
i
n|+ |Q
i
n||pi
i
n+1 − pi
i
n|
)
≤
1
nα/8
,
almost surely, for sufficiently large n.
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The following two propositions establish all the results on the noise terms that we need in the proof
of Theorem 4.1 (c.f. Section 4).
Proposition A.6. Assume that (H) holds and let i ∈ {1, 2}.
(i) For s ∈ Si, let
W i,1n+1(s) =
Rin(s)
piin(s)
(
1{si
n+1
=s} − pi
i
n(s)
)
∈ R. (A.5)
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
W i,1n+1(s), T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
(ii) Let
W
i
n+1 = δsi
n+1
− piin ∈ R
|Si|.
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
W
i,1
n+1, T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
(iii) Let
W i,3n+1 = G
i(·, s−in+1)−G
i(·, pi−in ) ∈ R
|Si|.
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
W i,3n+1, T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
Proof. We prove part (i) in detail. Given that the arguments are very similar, the remaining proofs
are omitted.
We apply Proposition A.1 with S = Si, Σ = ∆(Si), sn = s
i
n, Mn =M
i
n, pin = pi
i
n and H(r) = δr for
all r ∈ Si. Therefore in this case µn = pi
i
n and Vn+1 = δsi
n+1
. We also put εn = R
i
n(s)/pi
i
n(s).
From the fact that Rin is bounded, it is easy to see that points (i) and (ii) of Lemma A.5 respectively
imply assumptions (i) and (iii) of Proposition A.1. To confirm that assumption (ii) holds, it suffices
to compute
|Qin||εn − εn−1| =
|Qin||pi
i
n(s)(R
i
n(s)−R
i
n−1(s)) +R
i
n(s)(pi
i
n−1(s)− pi
i
n(s))|
piin(s)pi
i
n−1(s)
≤ c|Qin|n
−1+α
(A.6)
by definition of Rin, Lemma A.3 and equation (A.4), for sufficiently large n and any α > 0. Hence, by
Lemma A.5, |Qin||εn−εn−1| goes to zero almost surely as n goes to infinity. By using Proposition A.1,
we show that (U in+1/(n+ 1), T ) goes to zero almost surely for any T > 0, where
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U in+1 =
Rin(s)
piin(s)
(
δsi
n+1
− piin
)
∈ R|S
i|.
The result follows from the fact that the s-th component of the vector U in+1 is equal to W
i,1
n+1(s).
Proposition A.7. Assume that (H) holds and let us fix i ∈ {1, 2}.
(i) For s ∈ Si, let
W i,2n+1(s) =
1
piin(s)
(
1{si
n+1
=s}G
i(s1n+1, s
2
n+1)− pi
i
n(s)G
i(s, pi−in )
)
∈ R.
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
W i,2n+1, T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
(ii) Let
W i,4n+1 = G
i(sin+1, s
−i
n+1)−G
i(piin, pi
−i
n ) ∈ R.
Then, for all T > 0,

(
1
n+ 1
W i,4n+1, T
)
→ 0,
almost surely as n goes to infinity.
Proof. (i) For the sake of clarity, let us set i = 1. Again, we use Proposition A.1, where in this
case, S = S1 × S2, Σ is defined by
Σ =


∑
s2∈S2
σ2(s2)G1(·, s2) :
∑
s2∈S2
σ2(s2) = 1 and σ2(s2) ≥ 0 for all s2 ∈ S2

 ⊆ R|S1|,
sn = (s
1
n, s
2
n), Mn =M
1
n ⊗M
2
n, pin = pi
1
n ⊗ pi
2
n and H : S
1 × S2 → Σ where
H(s1, s2) = δs1G
1(s1, s2),
for all (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2. Notice that in this case δ is the Kronecker’s delta function taking
values in ∆(S1). Therefore in this case µn = (µn(s
1))s1∈S1 , with µn(s
1) = pi1n(s
1)G1(s1, pi2n)
and Vn+1 = (Vn+1(s
1))s1∈S1 , where
Vn+1(s
1) = 1{s1
n+1
=s1}G
1(s1n+1, s
2
n+1) = 1{s1
n+1
=s1}G
1(s1, s2n+1).
We also set in this case εn = 1/pi
1
n(s). Let Qn be the pseudo-inverse matrix of the stochastic
matrix Mn. It is easy to see that the spectral gap of Mn verifies that
χ(Mn) = χ(M
1
n ⊗M
2
n) = min{χ(M
1
n), χ(M
2
n)} = min{χ
1
n, χ
2
n}.
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By using inequality (A.3) for the matrix Qn and the fact that pin(s
1, s2) = pi1n(s
1)pi2n(s
2) ≥ n−α
for any α > 0 and sufficiently large n, we can obtain exactly the same conclusions as in
Lemma A.5 for Qn and pin.
Hence, as in the proof of Proposition A.6, we deduce that sequences (εn)n and (Qn)n verify
assumptions (i)-(iii) of Proposition A.1.
Therefore, we have that (U in+1/(n + 1), T ) goes to zero almost surely for any T > 0 where,
for s1 ∈ S1,
U in+1(s
1) =
1
pi1n(s)
(
1{s1
n+1
=s1}G
1(s1, s2n+1)− pi
1
n(s
1)G1(s1, pi2n)
)
=
1
pi1n(s)
(
1{s1
n+1
=s1}G
1(s1n+1, s
2
n+1)− pi
1
n(s
1)G1(s1, pi2n)
)
.
The conclusion follows taking s1 = s in the equation above.
(ii) The proof of this part also follows from Proposition A.1, taking as Σ a sufficiently large
compact set in R, sn = (s
1
n, s
2
n), Mn =M
1
n ⊗M
2
n, pin = pi
1
n ⊗ pi
2
n and H : S
1 × S2 → Σ, where
H(s1, s2) = Gi(s1, s2).
Therefore µn = G
i(piin, pi
−i
n ) and εn = 1 for all n ∈ N. Finally, using the same argument as in
part (i), we prove that the assumptions (i)-(iii) hold and we conclude.
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